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Reflections on the Question of When, if
Ever, Violence Is Justified in Struggles
for Political or Social Change
Based on Remarks Delivered in Honor of Nelson Mandela,
1918–2013
Susan H. Farbstein*
Part of me is very much drawn to the pacifist’s response: violence is never
justified in struggles to transition from one regime to another; violence is
bound to have a dehumanizing effect on those who perpetrate it and there-
fore a negative impact on any social or political arrangement that emerges.
However, I think that answer is ultimately not completely satisfying. We
may have to face the reality that governments are sometimes so evil, so
cruel, so unjust, and so destructive that people have a right to resist by
force. My concern is that insistence on non-violence may sometimes rein-
force injustice. In certain circumstances, force may be the last appeal to
human dignity and the last resort to realizing human rights.
My answer, thus, is highly context-dependent based upon asking: Who is
using the violence? What social or political change do they seek to achieve?
How and why, and by whom, was the decision made to resort to violence?
What was the precipitating event? What alternative strategies have been
attempted or discarded? What is the nature of the violence? Who is being
targeted? What are the peripheral effects of choosing violence?
In remembrance of Nelson Mandela, I will briefly consider the struggle
for social and political change in apartheid South Africa and explore three
justifications given by the African National Congress (“ANC”) when it
decided, in 1961, to establish an armed wing,1 Umkhonto We Sizwe
(“MK”), in its campaign to overthrow the apartheid government.
First, the cause itself was just. Apartheid was a crime against humanity.2 It
was an institutionalized regime of racial segregation and systematic oppres-
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1. NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 271–74 (1994) [hereinafter LONG WALK TO
FREEDOM].
2. 1 TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR., REPORT 94–102 (1998), available at http://
www.justice.gov.za/Trc/report/finalreport/Volume%201.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B2S3-2UQ9?
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sion created and implemented to secure the white minority’s hold on power
of every sort—power over government and politics, as well as power over
wealth in the form of land and resources—by denying the black population
their most fundamental political and personal rights. Apartheid was then
enforced by numerous other violations of international law: prolonged arbi-
trary detention; forced exile; forced relocation; revocation of nationality; re-
strictions on freedom of movement, speech, and assembly; extrajudicial
killings; torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; and labor
exploitation, to name a few.3 The rule of law was absent in apartheid South
Africa and there was no meaningful recourse to the courts to prevent or seek
accountability for these abuses. Instead, the legal system perpetuated and
facilitated the apartheid state.4
I find this justification fairly convincing. Rather than seeking to disrupt
the rule of law, the ANC challenged its failure. It is not sufficient that the
cause be just in order to resort to violence, but it is certainly necessary. If
Nazi Germany is the paradigmatic example in which force is legitimate to
overcome great evil,5 apartheid South Africa ranks a very close second.
Second, the turn to violence was a last resort. From its founding in 1912, the
ANC had been staunchly non-violent in its tactics, but the Sharpeville mas-
sacre represented a turning point.6 As Desmond Tutu explained,
“[Sharpeville] told us that even if we protested peacefully we would be
picked off like vermin and that black life was of little consequence.”7
Through legislation, the National Party had already drastically curtailed
the arena of legal political activity available to the ANC.8 Following
Sharpeville, it banned the ANC9 and declared a state of emergency.10 The
message was clear: non-violent mass mobilization would no longer be toler-
ated by the state. In this context, the decision to turn to violence seemed
imperative and was given moral legitimacy on the grounds of necessary self-
defense when other options had been exhausted:
type=pdf [hereinafter 1 TRC REPORT]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
3. 1 TRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 29–35; see generally 3 TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S.
AFR., REPORT (1998), available at http://www.justice.gov.za/Trc/report/finalreport/Volume%203.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/3DVZ-DTWC?type=pdf (providing overview of gross human rights viola-
tions committed during apartheid, as reported to the TRC) [hereinafter 3 TRC REPORT].
4. See generally 1 TRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 448–97 (outlining apartheid-era legislation).
5. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 253–54, 259–60 (1977).
6. On March 21, 1960, without warning, South African police deliberately fired into a crowd of
approximately five thousand unarmed people peacefully protesting against the pass laws, killing sixty-
nine and injuring several hundred. 3 TRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 533–37.
7. Desmond Tutu, Tutu: We Thank God for Madiba, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Dec. 6, 2013), http://
mg.co.za/article/2013-12-06-00-tutu-we-thank-god-for-madiba, archived at http://perma.cc/ST5F-
GGKH.
8. See 1 TRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 448–97.
9. 2 TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR., REPORT 9 (1998), available at  http://www.
justice.gov.za/Trc/report/finalreport/Volume%202.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L4TZ-4GDS?type=
pdf [hereinafter 2 TRC REPORT].
10. Id.
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The choice is not ours; it has been made by the Nationalist gov-
ernment. . . . The time comes in the life of any nation when there
remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now
come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice
but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our
people, our future and our freedom.11
This argument was linked to the related justification that the ANC needed
to give coherence to revolutionary violence and channel it toward liberation.
The ANC was concerned that South Africa was drifting toward a civil war
that would make the goal of racial harmony and equality even more diffi-
cult to achieve.12 From this perspective, the creation of MK was an attempt
to harness and direct violence that was spilling out, not at individual white
South Africans, but rather at the apartheid state itself.
I find this justification less persuasive, in part because an analysis of the
strategic gains and effectiveness of the violence potentially belies its neces-
sity, at least in retrospect. There is a reasonable argument to be made that,
at least at certain points, the armed struggle may have actually harmed the
anti-apartheid movement, and not just in terms of a loss of moral authority.
For example, the bombing campaign may have weakened simultaneous
non-violent campaigns, as the entire opposition movement could be tar-
nished by reference to its most violent components, and the apartheid gov-
ernment associated the two to justify greater repression and use of more
forceful responses.13 In addition, the turn to violence may have cost the
ANC some support at home and abroad.14 In order to defeat apartheid and
demonstrate its readiness to govern, the ANC needed to achieve maximum
involvement and support from non-whites in South Africa, involve at least
some of the white South African population in support of the non-white
population, and bring significant international pressure to bear. Non-vio-
lence may have been a better strategy to achieve these objectives. Most
problematically, the turn to armed struggle put little military pressure on
the government, but may have diverted the movement’s energies from other
methods of resistance and organization at home—strikes, boycotts, civil
disobedience, ungovernability—which were essential and, when linked
with South Africa’s political and economic isolation, ultimately led to
apartheid’s demise.15
11. Manifesto of Umkhonto we Sizwe Leaflet Issued by the Command of Umkhonto we Sizwe, 16th December
1961, AFR. NAT’L CONGRESS, available at http://www.anc.org.za/centenary/main.php?id=77&p=4 (last
visited Mar. 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/D5X2-G2RR.
12. Nelson Mandela, Statement from the Dock at the Opening of the Defense Case in the Rivonia
Trial at the Pretoria Supreme Court (Apr. 20, 1964), available at http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?
id=3430, archived at http://perma.cc/58SP-7D6X [hereinafter Statement from the Dock].
13. See Stephen Zunes, The Role of Non-Violent Action in the Downfall of Apartheid, 37 J. MOD. AFR.
STUD., 137, 139–40, 146–47 (1999).
14. Id. at 165–66.
15. Id. at 152–60.
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Third, the nature and degree of the violence was measured and minimal.
Mandela divided the MK’s efforts into four categories of incremental inten-
sity: sabotage, guerilla warfare, terrorism, and open revolution.16 He urged
the exclusive use of sabotage because “sabotage did not involve loss of life,
and it offered the best hope for future race relations.”17 He added that if
“[b]itterness would be kept to a minimum . . . democratic government
could become a reality.”18 The goal was not to seize power by force, but
rather to convince the apartheid government to negotiate. In a deeply segre-
gated society, it would have been easy to target white civilians, but instead
the MK sought to minimize collateral damage. Given the ANC’s need to
appeal to all South Africans, as well as to the international community, a
strategic decision was made to attempt to avoid arbitrary violence, cruelty,
or terror. Rather, the MK would respect the Geneva Conventions and prin-
ciples of international humanitarian law, such as proportionality and dis-
tinction.19 MK activities thus took the form of attacks on government and
military installations.20 From this perspective, the armed struggle was
armed propaganda that provided physical evidence of a tangible potential
threat to the regime and a boost to morale while reinforcing the sense that
resistance would continue despite repression.
Ultimately, I find this justification problematic. Even if unintentionally,
civilians were killed in acts of sabotage committed by the ANC.21 Detainees
suffered horrific abuses in ANC camps in exile—beatings, torture, sum-
mary executions—and treatment of suspected informants and collaborators
inside South Africa rivaled the gruesomeness of many abuses committed by
the apartheid state.22 Although the apartheid government was responsible
for more violence, and although the ANC was fighting a just war, its
human rights violations cannot be justified simply as the lesser evil, or by
16. LONG WALK TO FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 282–83.
17. Statement from the Dock, supra note 12.
18. Id.
19. Oliver Tambo, Statement on Signing Declaration, on Behalf of the ANC and Umkhonto we
Sizwe, Adhering to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol 1 of 1977, at the Headquarters of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva (Nov. 28, 1980), available at http://www.nelson-
mandela.org/omalley/cis/omalley/OMalleyWeb/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv02918/06lv02979.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/RZD7-QUBR.
20. LONG WALK TO FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 285–86, 506.
21. Id. at 518; Afr. Nat’l Congress, Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Aug.
1996), available at http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/submit/anctruth.htm, archived at http://perma
.cc/YJ9K-3VUK; 2 TRC REPORT, supra note 9, at 325–35.
22. SKWEYIYA COMM’N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO COMPLAINTS BY FORMER
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS PRISONERS AND DETAINEES (1992), available at http://www.anc.org.za/
show.php?id=95, archived at http://perma.cc/87S9-825H; AMNESTY INT’L, SOUTH AFRICA: TORTURE,
ILL-TREATMENT AND EXECUTIONS IN AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS CAMPS (1992), available at http://
www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR53/027/1992/en/ccd2a8fb-f93a-11dd-92e7-c59f81373cf2/afr53
0271992en.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M78V-DZWZ?type=pdf; MOTSUENYANE COMM’N, REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS OF CRUELTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSE AGAINST AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS PRISONERS AND DETAINEES BY AFRICAN NATIONAL
CONGRESS MEMBERS (1993); 2 TRC REPORT, supra note 9, at 335–66.
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the moral gap between those who strive to maintain oppression and those
who fight on behalf of liberation.
So where does this leave us in attempting to answer the question posed?
As with most moral dilemmas, we are left with an unsatisfying conclusion.
Any means necessary may have been justified to end apartheid, but twenty
years later, South Africa is still struggling with the legacy of that vio-
lence.23 There is a sense in South Africa today that violence is the norm—if
not acceptable, an all-too-common way of resolving social, political, eco-
nomic, and interpersonal disputes.24 South Africans across the political
spectrum were substantially dehumanized and violated by apartheid. This
reality has fundamental implications for the capacity of individuals to en-
gage in acts of violence and brutality—particularly individuals who feel
disempowered and lack other outlets for addressing grievances—as well as
on the capacity of a society to tolerate such abuses.
Ultimately, it is not enough to answer the question posed. We must ask
ourselves an equally important follow-up question: If violence is sometimes
justified—or at least resorted to—in struggles for social and political
change, how might the damage inflicted on the emerging society be mini-
mized? Mandela’s legacy of forgiveness and reconciliation offers the begin-
ning of an answer.
23. See, e.g., Ryan Lenora Brown, Briefing: How Violent is South Africa?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2013/0222/Briefing-How-violent-is-South-
Africa, archived at http://perma.cc/8G78-C439; Angelo Fick, South Africa: A History of Violence, ENEWS
CHANNEL AFRICA (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.enca.com/opinion/south-africa-history-violence, archived
at http://perma.cc/HXN5-RDNH; CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENCE AND RECONCILIATION, WHY
DOES SOUTH AFRICA HAVE SUCH HIGH RATES OF VIOLENT CRIME? 3–7 (Apr. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/study/7.unique_about_SA.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XQ4R-SMSQ.
24. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 23; see also Lizette Lancaster, Is South Africa an Inherently Violent
Country?, INST. FOR SECURITY STUDIES (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/is-south-
africa-an-inherently-violent-country, archived at http://perma.cc/6YRG-7CBR.
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